The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867Various
Philosophy
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
e. is an _Ego_.
I.
1. Dependent being, implying its complement upon which it depends,
cannot be explained through itself, but through that upon which it
depends.
2. This being upon which it depends cannot be also a dependent being,
for the dependent being has no support of its own to lend to another;
all that it has is borrowed. “A chain of dependent beings collapses into
one dependent being. Dependence is not converted into independence by
mere multiplication.”
3. The dependent, therefore, depends upon the independent, and has its
explanation in it. Since all being is of one kind or the other, it
follows that all being is independent, or a complemental element of it.
Reciprocal dependence makes an independent including whole, which is the
_negative unity_.
_Definition._—One of the most important implements of the thinker is the
comprehension of “negative unity.” It is a unity resulting from the
reciprocal cancelling of elements; e. g. _Salt_ is the negative unity of
_acid_ and _alkali_. It is called _negative_ because it negates the
independence of the elements within it. In the negative unity _Air_, the
elements oxygen and nitrogen have their independence negated.
II.
1. The independent being cannot exist without determinations. Without
these, it could not distinguish itself or be distinguished from nought.
2. Nor can the independent being be determined (i. e. limited or
modified in any way) from without, or through another. For all that is
determined through another is a dependent somewhat.
3. Hence the independent being can be only a self-determined. If
self-determined, it can exist through itself.
_Note._
Spinoza does not arrive at the third position, but, after considering
the second, arrives at the first one, and concludes, since determination
through another makes a somewhat _finite_, that the independent being
must be _undetermined_. He does not happen to discover that there is
another kind of determination, to-wit, self-determination, which can
consist with independence. The method that he uses makes it entirely an
accidental matter with him that he discovers what speculative results he
does—the dialectic method would lead inevitably to self-determination,
as we shall see later. It is Hegel’s _aperçu_ that we have in the third
position; with Spinoza the independent being remained an undetermined
_substance_, but with Hegel it became a self-determining _subject_. All
that Spinoza gets out of his substance he must get in an arbitrary
manner; it does not follow from its definition that it shall have modes
and attributes, but the contrary. This _aperçu_—that the independent
being, i. e. every really existing, separate entity, is
self-determined—is the central point of speculative philosophy. What
self-determination involves, we shall see next.
III.
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