There is no doubt that it is an immediate fact of consciousness—I feel _myself_ thus or thus determined. Now, when the oft-lauded philosophers attempt to _explain_ this feeling, is it not clear that they attempt to append something to it which is not immediately involved in the fact? and how can they do this, except through thinking, and through a thinking according to a category, which category is here that of the real ground? Now, if they have not an immediate contemplation of the thing _per se_ and its relations, what else can they possibly know of this category, but that they are compelled to think according to it? They assert nothing but that _they_ are compelled to add in thought a thing as the ground of this feeling. But this we cheerfully admit in regard to the standpoint which they occupy. Their thing is produced by their thinking; and now it is at the same time to be a thing _per se_, i. e. not produced by thinking. I really do not comprehend them; I can neither think this thought, nor think an understanding which does think it; and by this declaration, I hope I have done with them forever. VII. Having finished this digression, we now return to our original intention, which was to describe the procedure of the Science of Knowledge, and to justify it against the attacks of certain philosophers. We said, the philosopher observes himself in the act whereby he constructs for himself the conception of himself; and we now add, he also _thinks this act of his_. For the philosopher, doubtless, knows whereof he speaks; but a mere contemplation gives no consciousness; only that is known which is conceived and thought. This conception or comprehension of his activity is very well possible for the philosopher, since he is already in possession of experience; for he has a conception of _activity in general, and as such_, namely, as the opposite of the equally well known conception of _Being_; and he also has a conception of this _particular_ activity, as that of an _intelligence_, i. e. as simply an ideal activity, and not the real causality of the practical Ego; and moreover, a conception of the peculiar character of this particular activity as an _in itself returning activity_, and not an activity directed upon an external object.