The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867 — John Shaqi
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867Various
Philosophy
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
3. But to change a resistance requires force, which (in motion) must act
in “the direction of the least resistance,” and hence it is entirely
determined from without, and governed by the disposition of the forces
it meets.
4. Hence, of _will_, it is an absurdity to talk; _freedom_ or _moral
agency_ is an impossible phantom.
5. That there is self-determination in self-consciousness—that it is
“self-created”—is to Mr. Spencer the absurd alternative which at once
turns the scale in favor of the doctrine that mental phenomena are the
productions of external forces.
After this, what are we to say of the following? (P. 501):
“Notwithstanding all evidence to the contrary, there will probably have
arisen in not a few minds the conviction that the solutions which have
been given, along with those to be derived from them, are essentially
materialistic. Let none persist in these misconceptions.” (P. 502):
“Their implications are no more materialistic than they are
spiritualistic, and no more spiritualistic than they are materialistic.”
If we hold these positions by the side of Kant’s Third Antinomy, we
shall see that they all belong to the proof of the “Antithesis,” viz:
“There is no freedom, but everything in the world happens according to
the laws of nature.” The “Thesis,” viz: “That a causality of freedom is
necessary to account fully for the phenomena of the world,” he has not
anywhere supported. We find, in fact, only those thinkers who have in
some measure mastered the third phase of culture in thought, standing
upon the basis presented by Kant in the Thesis. The chief point in the
Thesis may be stated as follows: 1. If everything that happens
presupposes a previous condition, (which the law of causality states,)
2. This previous condition cannot be a permanent (or have been always in
existence); for, if so, its consequence, or the effect, would have
always existed. Thus the previous condition must be a thing which has
happened. 3. With this the whole law of causality collapses; for (_a_)
since each cause is an effect, (_b_) its determining power escapes into
a higher member of the series, and, (_c_) unless the law changes, wholly
vanishes; there result an indefinite series of effects with no cause;
each member of the series is a dependent, has its being in another,
which again has its being in another, and hence cannot support the
subsequent term.
Hence it is evident that this Antinomy consists, first: in the setting
up of the law of causality as having absolute validity, which is the
antithesis. Secondly, the experience is made that such absolute law of
causality is a self-nugatory one, and thus it is to be inferred that
causality, to be at all, presupposes an origination in a “self-moved,”
as Plato calls it. Aristotle (Metaphysics, xi. 6-7, and ix. 8) exhibits
this ultimate as the “self-active,” and the Scholastics take the same,
under the designation “_actus purus_,” for the definition of God.
The Antinomy thus reduced gives:
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account