The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867Various
Philosophy
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
_a priori_ of the human mind; and in so far as they are viewed, also—if
they should agree with experience—as given in experience, they are
called _a posteriori_. Hence the _a priori_ and the _a posteriori_ are,
in a true Philosophy, not two, but one and the same, only viewed in two
different ways, and distinguished only by the manner in which they are
obtained. Philosophy anticipates the whole experience, _thinks_ it only
as necessary; and, in so far, Philosophy is, in comparison with real
experience, _a priori_. The number is _a posteriori_, if regarded as
given; the same number is _a priori_, if regarded as product of the
factors. Whosoever says otherwise knows not what he talks about.
If the results of a Philosophy do not agree with experience, that
Philosophy is surely wrong; for it has not fulfilled its promise of
deducing the whole experience from the necessary action of the
intelligence. In that case, either the presupposition of transcendental
Idealism is altogether incorrect, or it has merely been incorrectly
treated in the particular representation of that science. Now, since the
problem, to explain experience from its ground, is a problem contained
in human reason, and as no rational man will admit that human reason
contains any problem the solution of which is altogether impossible; and
since, moreover, there are only two ways of solving it, the dogmatic
system (which, as we have shown, cannot accomplish what it promises) and
the Idealistic system, every resolute Thinker will always declare that
the latter has been the case; that the presupposition in itself is
correct enough, and that no failure in attempts to represent it should
deter men from attempting it again until finally it must succeed. The
course of this Idealism proceeds, as we have seen, from a fact of
consciousness—but which is only obtained by a free act of Thinking—to
the total experience. Its peculiar ground is between these two. It is
not a fact of consciousness and does not belong within the sphere of
experience; and, indeed, how could it be called Philosophy if it did,
since Philosophy has to discover the ground of experience, and since the
ground lies, of course, beyond the sequence. It is the production of
free Thinking, but proceeding according to laws. This will be at once
clear, if we look a little closer at the fundamental assertion of
Idealism. It proves that the Postulated is not possible without a
second, this not without a third, &c., &c.; hence none of all its
conditions is possible alone and by itself, but each one is only
possible in its union with all the rest. Hence, according to its own
assertion, only the Whole is found in consciousness, and this Whole is
the experience. You want to obtain a better knowledge of it; hence you
must analyze it, not by blindly groping about, but according to the
fixed rule of composition, so that it arises under your eyes as a Whole.
You are enabled to do this because you have the power of abstraction;
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