The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 1Madison, James
History
The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 1
Madison, James
Constitutional law -- United States; Constitutions -- United States; United States. Constitution
not within the purview of the article of the Confederation providing
for alterations & amendments. But may not the States themselves in
which no constitutional authority equal to this purpose exists in the
Legislatures, have had in view a reference to the people at large. In
the Senate of N. York, a proviso was moved, that no act of the
Convention should be binding untill it should be referred to the
people & ratified; and the motion was lost by a single voice only, the
reason assigned ag^{st} it being, that it might possibly be found an
inconvenient shackle.
[88] Hamilton happened to call upon Madison while the latter was
putting the last touches to this speech and "acknowledged
its fidelity, without suggesting more than a few verbal
alterations which were made."--(Cf. _Madison's Writings_,
vol. ii.). A brief of the speech from the Hamilton Papers is
given in Lodge's _Works of Hamilton_, i., 353, where (i.,
375) Yates's report also is quoted.
[Illustration: HAMILTON'S PRINCIPAL SPEECH.
(Reduced.)]
The great question is what provision shall we make for the happiness of
our Country? He would first make a comparative examination of the two
plans--prove that there were essential defects in both--and point out
such changes as might render a _national one_, efficacious.--The great &
essential principles necessary for the support of Government are 1. an
active & constant interest in supporting it. This principle does not
exist in the States in favor of the federal Gov^t. They have evidently
in a high degree, the esprit de corps. They constantly pursue internal
interests adverse to those of the whole. They have their particular
debts--their particular plans of finance &c. All these when opposed to,
invariably prevail over the requisitions & plans of Congress. 2. The
love of power. Men love power. The same remarks are applicable to this
principle. The States have constantly shewn a disposition rather to
regain the powers delegated by them than to part with more, or to give
effect to what they had parted with. The ambition of their demagogues is
known to hate the controul of the Gen^l Government. It may be remarked
too that the Citizens have not that anxiety to prevent a dissolution of
the Gen^l Gov^t as of the particular Gov^{ts}. A dissolution of the
latter would be fatal; of the former would still leave the purposes of
Gov^t attainable to a considerable degree. Consider what such a State as
Virg^a will be in a few years, a few compared with the life of nations.
How strongly will it feel its importance and self-sufficiency? 3. An
habitual attachment of the people. The whole force of this tie is on
the side of the State Gov^t. Its sovereignty is immediately before
the eyes of the people: its protection is immediately enjoyed by
them. From its hand distributive justice, and all those acts which
familiarize & endear a Gov^t to a people, are dispensed to them. 4.
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