_Force_ by which may be understood a _coercion of laws_ or _coercion of arms_. Cong^s have not the former except in few cases. In particular States, this Coercion is nearly sufficient; tho' he held it in most cases, not entirely so. A certain portion of military force is absolutely necessary in large communities. Mass^{ts} is now feeling this necessity & making provision for it. But how can this force be exerted on the States collectively. It is impossible. It amounts to a war between the parties. Foreign powers also will not be idle spectators. They will interpose, the confusion will increase, and a dissolution of the Union will ensue. 5. _Influence._ he did not mean corruption, but a dispensation of those regular honors & emoluments, which produce an attachment to the Gov^t. Almost all the weight of these is on the side of the States; and must continue so as long as the States continue to exist. All the passions then we see, of avarice, ambition, interest, which govern most individuals, and all public bodies, fall into the current of the States, and do not flow into the stream of the Gen^l Gov^t. The former therefore will generally be an overmatch for the Gen^l Gov^t and render any confederacy, in its very nature precarious. Theory is in this case fully confirmed by experience. The Amphyctionic Council had it would seem ample powers for general purposes. It had in particular the power of fining and using force ag^{st} delinquent members. What was the consequence. Their decrees were mere signals of war. The Phocian war is a striking example of it. Philip at length taking advantage of their disunion, and insinuating himself into their councils, made himself master of their fortunes. The German Confederacy affords another lesson. The Authority of Charlemagne seemed to be as great as could be necessary. The great feudal chiefs however, exercising their local sovereignties, soon felt the spirit & found the means of, encroachments, which reduced the imperial authority to a nominal sovereignty. The Diet has succeeded, which tho' aided by a Prince at its head, of great authority independently of his imperial attributes, is a striking illustration of the weakness of Confederated Governments. Other examples instruct us in the same truth. The Swiss cantons have scarce any union at all, and have been more than once at war with one another.--How then are all these evils to be avoided? only by such a compleat sovereignty in the General Goverm^t as will turn all the strong principles & passions abovementioned on its side. Does the scheme of N. Jersey produce this effect? does it afford any substantial remedy whatever? On the contrary it labors under great defects, and the defect of some of its provisions will destroy the efficacy of others. It gives a direct revenue to Cong^s but this will not be sufficient. The balance can only be supplied by requisitions: which experience proves cannot be relied on. If States are to deliberate on the mode, they will also