The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 1Madison, James
History
The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 1
Madison, James
Constitutional law -- United States; Constitutions -- United States; United States. Constitution
If they were extinguished, he was persuaded that great
oeconomy might be obtained by substituting a general Gov^t. He did not
mean however to shock the public opinion by proposing such a measure. On
the other hand he saw no _other_ necessity for declining it. They are
not necessary for any of the great purposes of commerce, revenue, or
agriculture. Subordinate authorities he was aware would be necessary.
There must be district tribunals; corporations for local purposes. But
cui bono, the vast & expensive apparatus now appertaining to the States.
The only difficulty of a serious nature which occurred to him, was that
of drawing representatives from the extremes to the centre of the
Community. What inducements can be offered that will suffice? The
moderate wages for the 1^{st} branch would only be a bait to little
demagogues. Three dollars or thereabouts he supposed would be the
utmost. The Senate he feared from a similar cause, would be filled by
certain undertakers who wish for particular offices under the Gov^t.
This view of the subject almost led him to despair that a Republican
Gov^t could be established over so great an extent. He was sensible at
the same time that it would be unwise to propose one of any other form.
In his private opinion he had no scruple in declaring, supported as he
was by the opinion of so many of the wise & good, that the British Gov^t
was the best in the world: and that he doubted much whether any thing
short of it would do in America. He hoped Gentlemen of different
opinions would bear with him in this, and begged them to recollect the
change of opinion on this subject which had taken place and was still
going on. It was once thought that the power of Cong^s was amply
sufficient to secure the end of their institution. The error was now
seen by every one. The members most tenacious of republicanism, he
observed, were as loud as any in declaiming ag^{st} the vices of
democracy. This progress of the public mind led him to anticipate the
time, when others as well as himself would join in the praise bestowed
by M^r Neckar on the British Constitution, namely, that it is the only
Gov^t in the world "which unites public strength with individual
security."--In every Co[~m]unity where industry is encouraged, there
will be a division of it into the few & the many. Hence separate
interests will arise. There will be debtors & Creditors &c. Give all
power to the many, they will oppress the few. Give all power to the few,
they will oppress the many. Both therefore ought to have the power, that
each may defend itself ag^{st} the other. To the want of this check we
owe our paper money, instalment laws &c. To the proper adjustment of it
the British owe the excellence of their Constitution. Their house of
Lords is a most noble institution. Having nothing to hope for by a
change, and a sufficient interest by means of their property, in being
faithful to the national interest, they form a permanent barrier ag^{st}
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