The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 1Madison, James
History
The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 1
Madison, James
Constitutional law -- United States; Constitutions -- United States; United States. Constitution
other plan of appointing him for 7 years, he thought the Executive ought
to have but little power. He would be ambitious, with the means of
making creatures, and as the object of his ambition w^d be to _prolong_
his power, it is probable that in case of a war, he would avail himself
of the emergence, to evade or refuse a degradation from his place. An
Executive for life has not this motive for forgetting his fidelity, and
will therefore be a safer depository of power. It will be objected
probably, that such an Executive will be an _elective Monarch_, and will
give birth to the tumults which characterize that form of Gov^t. He w^d
reply that _Monarch_ is an indefinite term. It marks not either the
degree or duration of power. If this Executive Magistrate w^d be a
monarch for life--the other prop^d by the Report from the Co[~m]ittee of
the whole, w^d be a monarch for seven years. The circumstance of being
elective was also applicable to both. It had been observed by judicious
writers that elective monarchies w^d be the best if they could be
guarded ag^{st} the _tumults_ excited by the ambition and intrigues of
competitors. He was not sure that tumults were an inseparable evil. He
rather thought this character of Elective Monarchies had been taken
rather from particular cases than from general principles. The election
of Roman Emperors was made by the _Army_. In _Poland_ the election is
made by great rival _princes_ with independent power, and ample means,
of raising commotions. In the German Empire, The appointment is made by
the Electors & Princes, who have equal motives & means, for exciting
cabals & parties. Might not such a mode of election be devised among
ourselves as will defend the community ag^{st} these effects in any
dangerous degree? Having made these observations he would read to the
Committee a sketch of a plan which he sh^d prefer to either of those
under consideration. He was aware that it went beyond the ideas of most
members. But will such a plan be adopted out of doors? In return he
would ask will the people adopt the other plan? At present they will
adopt neither. But he sees the Union dissolving or already dissolved--he
sees evils operating in the States which must soon cure the people of
their fondness for democracies--he sees that a great progress has been
already made & is still going on in the public mind. He thinks therefore
that the people will in time be unshackled from their prejudices; and
whenever that happens, they will themselves not be satisfied at stopping
where the plan of M^r R. w^d place them, but be ready to go as far at
least as he proposes. He did not mean to offer the paper he had sketched
as a proposition to the Committee. It was meant only to give a more
correct view of his ideas, and to suggest the amendments which he should
probably propose to the plan of M^r R. in the proper stages of its
future discussion. He read his sketch in the words following; to wit
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