The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 1Madison, James
History
The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 1
Madison, James
Constitutional law -- United States; Constitutions -- United States; United States. Constitution
Sovereignty could ever voluntarily part with it. It was not to be
expected from any one State, much less from thirteen. He proceeded to
make some observations on the plan itself and the argum^{ts} urged in
support of it. The point of Representation could receive no elucidation
from the case of England. The corruption of the boroughs did not proceed
from their comparative smallness; but from the actual fewness of the
inhabitants, some of them not having more than one or two. A great
inequality existed in the Counties of England. Yet the like complaint of
peculiar corruption in the small ones had not been made. It had been
said that Congress represent the State Prejudices: will not any other
body whether chosen by the Legislatures or people of the States, also
represent their prejudices? It had been asserted by his colleague (Col.
Hamilton) that there was no coincidence of interests among the large
States that ought to excite fears of oppression in the smaller. If it
were true that such a uniformity of interests existed among the States,
there was equal safety for all of them, whether the representation
remained as heretofore, or were proportioned as now proposed. It is
proposed that the Gen^l Legislature shall have a negative on the laws of
the States. Is it conceivable that there will be leisure for such a
task? There will on the most moderate calculation, be as many Acts sent
up from the States as there are days in the year. Will the members of
the General Legislature be competent Judges? Will a gentleman from
Georgia be a judge of the expediency of a law which is to operate in N.
Hampshire. Such a Negative would be more injurious than that of Great
Britain heretofore was. It is said that the National Gov^t must have the
influence arising from the grant of offices and honors. In order to
render such a Government effectual he believed such an influence to be
necessary. But if the States will not agree to it, it is in vain, worse
than in vain to make the proposition. If this influence is to be
attained, the States must be entirely abolished. Will any one say this
would ever be agreed to? He doubted whether any Gen^l Government equally
beneficial to all can be attained. That now under consideration he is
sure, must be utterly unattainable. He had another objection. The system
was too novel & complex. No man could foresee what its operation will be
either with respect to the Gen^l Gov^t or the State Gov^{ts}. One or
other it has been surmised must absorb the whole.
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