The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 1Madison, James
History
The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 1
Madison, James
Constitutional law -- United States; Constitutions -- United States; United States. Constitution
M^r Ghoram observed that as the report consisted of propositions
mutually conditional he wished to hear some explanations touching the
grounds on which the conditions were estimated.
M^r Gerry. The Committee were of different opinions as well as the
Deputations from which the Com^e were taken, and agreed to the Report
merely in order that some ground of accommodation might be proposed.
Those opposed to the equality of votes have only assented conditionally;
and if the other side do not generally agree will not be under any
obligation to support the Report.
Mr. Wilson thought the Committee had exceeded their powers.
M^r Martin was for taking the question on the whole report.
M^r Wilson was for a division of the question; otherwise it w^d be a
leap in the dark.
M^r Madison could not regard the privilege of originating money bills as
any concession on the side of the small States. Experience proved that
it had no effect. If seven States in the upper branch wished a bill to
be originated, they might surely find some member from some of the same
States in the lower branch who would originate it. The restriction as to
amendments was of as little consequence. Amendments could be handed
privately by the Senate to members in the other house. Bills could be
negatived that they might be sent up in the desired shape. If the Senate
should yield to the obstinacy of the 1^{st} branch the use of that body
as a check would be lost. If the 1^{st} branch should yield to that of
the Senate, the privilege would be nugatory. Experience had also shewn
both in G. B. and the States having a similar regulation that it was a
source of frequent & obstinate altercations. These considerations had
produced a rejection of a like motion on a former occasion when judged
by its own merits. It could not therefore be deemed any concession on
the present, and left in force all the objections which had prevailed
ag^{st} allowing each State an equal voice. He conceived that the
Convention was reduced to the alternative of either departing from
justice in order to conciliate the smaller States, and the minority of
the people of the U. S. or of displeasing these by justly gratifying the
larger States and the majority of the people. He could not himself
hesitate as to the option he ought to make. The Convention with justice
& the majority of the people on their side, had nothing to fear. With
injustice and the minority on their side they had every thing to fear.
It was in vain to purchase concord in the Convention on terms which
would perpetuate discord among their Constituents. The Convention ought
to pursue a plan which would bear the test of examination, which would
be espoused & supported by the enlightened and impartial part of
America, & which they could themselves vindicate and urge. It should be
considered that altho' at first many may judge of the system
reco[~m]ended, by their opinion of the Convention, yet finally all will
judge of the Convention by the System.
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