The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 1Madison, James
History
The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 1
Madison, James
Constitutional law -- United States; Constitutions -- United States; United States. Constitution
M^r Wilson could see nothing like a concession here on the part of the
smaller States. If both branches were to say yes or no, it was of little
consequence which should say yes or no first, which last. If either was
indiscriminately to have the right of originating, the reverse of the
Report, would he thought be most proper; since it was a maxim that the
least numerous body was the fittest for deliberation; the most numerous
for decision. He observed that this discrimination had been transcribed
from the British into several American constitutions. But he was
persuaded that on examination of the American experiments it would be
found to be a trifle light as air. Nor could he ever discover the
advantage of it in the Parliamentary history of G. Britain. He hoped if
there was any advantage in the privilege, that it would be pointed out.
M^r Williamson thought that if the privilege were not common to both
branches it ought rather to be confined to the 2^d as the bills in that
case would be more narrowly watched, than if they originated with the
branch having most of the popular confidence.
M^r Mason. The consideration which weighed with the Committee was that
the 1^{st} branch would be the immediate representatives of the people,
the 2^d would not. Should the latter have the power of giving away the
people's money, they might soon forget the source from whence they
received it. We might soon have an aristocracy. He had been much
concerned at the principles which had been advanced by some gentlemen,
but had the satisfaction to find they did not generally prevail. He was
a friend to proportional representation in both branches; but supposed
that some points must be yielded for the sake of accomodation.
M^r Wilson. If he had proposed that the 2^d branch should have an
independent disposal of public money, the observations of (Col. Mason)
would have been a satisfactory answer. But nothing could be farther from
what he had said. His question was how is the power of the 1^{st} branch
increased or that of the 2^d diminished by giving the proposed privilege
to the former? Where is the difference, in which branch it begins, if
both must concur, in the end?
M^r Gerry would not say that the concession was a sufficient one on the
part of the small States. But he could not but regard it in the light of
a concession. It w^d make it a constitutional principle that the 2^d
branch were not possessed of the Confidence of the people in money
matters, which w^d lessen their weight & influence. In the next place if
the 2^d branch were dispossessed of the privilege, they w^d be deprived
of the opportunity which their continuance in office 3 times as long as
the 1^{st} branch would give them of making three successive essays in
favor of a particular point.
M^r Pinkney thought it evident that the Concession was wholly on one
side, that of the large States, the privilege of originating money bills
being of no account.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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