The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 1Madison, James
History
The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 1
Madison, James
Constitutional law -- United States; Constitutions -- United States; United States. Constitution
M^r Gov^r Morris had waited to hear the good effects of the restriction.
As to the alarm sounded, of an aristocracy, his creed was that there
never was, nor ever will be a civilized Society without an aristocracy.
His endeavor was to keep it as much as possible from doing mischief. The
restriction if it has any real operation, will deprive us of the
services of the 2^d branch in digesting & proposing money bills of which
it will be more capable than the 1^{st} branch. It will take away the
responsibility of the 2^d branch, the great security for good behavior.
It will always leave a plea, as to an obnoxious money bill that it was
disliked, but could not be constitutionally amended; nor safely
rejected. It will be a dangerous source of disputes between the two
Houses. We should either take the British Constitution altogether or
make one for ourselves. The Executive there has dissolved two Houses as
the only cure for such disputes. Will our Executive be able to apply
such a remedy? Every law directly or indirectly takes money out of the
pockets of the people. Again What use may be made of such a privilege in
case of great emergency? Suppose an Enemy at the door, and money
instantly & absolutely necessary for repelling him, may not the popular
branch avail itself of this duress, to extort concessions from the
Senate destructive of the Constitution itself. He illustrated this
danger by the example of the Long Parliament's exped^{ts} for subverting
the H. of Lords; concluding on the whole that the restriction would be
either useless or pernicious.
Doc^r Franklin did not mean to go into a justification of the Report,
but as it had been asked what would be the use of restraining the 2^d
branch from medling with money bills, he could not but remark that it
was always of importance that the people should know who had disposed of
their money, & how it had been disposed of. It was a maxim that those
who feel, can best judge. This end would, he thought, be best attained,
if money affairs were to be confined to the immediate representatives of
the people. This was his inducement to concur in the report. As to the
danger or difficulty that might arise from a Negative in the 2^d where
the people w^d not be proportionately represented, it might easily be
got over by declaring that there should be no such negative; or if that
will not do, by declaring that there shall be no such branch at all.
M^r Martin said that it was understood in the Committee that the
difficulties and disputes which had been apprehended, should be guarded
ag^{st} in the detailing of the plan.
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