The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 2 — John Shaqi
The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 2Madison, James
History
The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 2
Madison, James
Constitutional law -- United States; Constitutions -- United States; United States. Constitution
M^r Madison considered the object of the motion as of great importance
to the meditated Constitution. It would be useful to the Judiciary
departm^t by giving it an additional opportunity of defending itself
ag^{st} Legislative encroachments: It would be useful to the Executive,
by inspiring additional confidence & firmness in exerting the
revisionary power: It would be useful to the Legislature by the valuable
assistance it would give in preserving a consistency, conciseness,
perspicuity & technical propriety in the laws, qualities peculiarly
necessary; & yet shamefully wanting in our republican Codes. It would
moreover be useful to the Community at large as an additional check
ag^{st} a pursuit of those unwise & unjust measures which constituted so
great a portion of our calamities. If any solid objection could be urged
ag^{st} the motion, it must be on the supposition that it tended to give
too much strength either to the Executive or Judiciary. He did not think
there was the least ground for this apprehension. It was much more to be
apprehended that notwithstanding this co-operation of the two
departments, the Legislature would still be an overmatch for them.
Experience in all the States had evinced a powerful tendency in the
Legislature to absorb all power into its vortex. This was the real
source of danger to the American Constitutions; & suggested the
necessity of giving every defensive authority to the other departments
that was consistent with Republican principles.
M^r Mason said he had always been a friend to this provision. It would
give a confidence to the Executive, which he would not otherwise have,
and without which the Revisionary power would be of little avail.
M^r Gerry did not expect to see this point which had undergone full
discussion, again revived. The object he conceived of the Revisionary
power was merely to secure the Executive department ag^{st} legislative
encroachment. The Executive therefore who will best know and be ready to
defend his rights ought alone to have the defence of them. The motion
was liable to strong objections. It was combining & mixing together the
Legislative & the other departments. It was establishing an improper
coalition between the Executive & Judiciary departments. It was making
statesmen of the Judges; and setting them up as the guardians of the
Rights of the people. He relied for his part on the Representatives of
the people as the guardians of their Rights & interests. It was making
the Expositors of the Laws, the Legislators which ought never to be
done. A better expedient for correcting the laws, would be to appoint as
had been done in Pen^a, a person or persons of proper skill, to draw
bills for the Legislature.
M^r Strong thought with M^r Gerry that the power of making ought to be
kept distinct from that of expounding, the laws. No maxim was better
established. The Judges in exercising the function of expositors might
be influenced by the part they had taken in framing the laws.
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