The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 2Madison, James
History
The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 2
Madison, James
Constitutional law -- United States; Constitutions -- United States; United States. Constitution
M^r Madison. As we ought to be governed by national and permanent
views, it is a sufficient argument for giving y^e power over exports
that a tax, tho' it may not be expedient at present, may be so
hereafter. A proper regulation of exports may & probably will be
necessary hereafter, and for the same purposes as the regulation of
imports; viz, for revenue--domestic manufactures--and procuring
equitable regulations from other nations. An Embargo may be of absolute
necessity, and can alone be effectuated by the Gen^l authority. The
regulation of trade between State and State cannot effect more than
indirectly to hinder a State from taxing its own exports; by authorizing
its Citizens to carry their commodities freely into a neighbouring State
which might decline taxing exports in order to draw into its channel the
trade of its neighbours. As to the fear of disproportionate burthens on
the more exporting States, it might be remarked that it was agreed on
all hands that the revenue w^d principally be drawn from trade, and as
only a given revenue would be needed, it was not material whether all
should be drawn wholly from imports--or half from those, and half from
exports. The imports and exports must be pretty nearly equal in every
State--and relatively the same among the different States.
M^r Elseworth did not conceive an embargo by the Congress interdicted by
this section.
M^r M^cHenry conceived that power to be included in the power of war.
M^r Wilson. Pennsylvania exports the produce of Mary^d N. Jersey,
Delaware & will by & by when the River Delaware is opened, export for N.
York. In favoring the general power over exports therefore, he opposed
the particular interest of his State. He remarked that the power had
been attacked by reasoning which could only have held good in case the
Gen^l Gov^t had been _compelled_, instead of _authorized_, to lay duties
on exports. To deny this power is to take from the Common Gov^t half the
regulation of trade. It was his opinion that a power over exports might
be more effectual than that over imports in obtaining beneficial
treaties of commerce.
M^r Gerry was strenuously opposed to the power over exports. It might be
made use of to compel the States to comply with the will of the Gen^l
Government, and to grant it any new powers which might be demanded. We
have given it more power already than we know how will be exercised. It
will enable the Gen^l Gov^t to oppress the States as much as Ireland is
oppressed by Great Britain.
M^r Fitzimmons[36] would be ag^{st} a tax on exports to be laid
immediately; but was for giving a power of laying the tax when a proper
time may call for it. This would certainly be the case when America
should become a manufacturing Country. He illustrated his argument by
the duties in G. Britain on wool &c.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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