"As appointments for the General Government here contemplated will, in part, be made by the State Gov^{ts}, all the Citizens in States where the right of suffrage is not limited to the holders of property, will have an indirect share of representation in the General Government. But this does not satisfy the fundamental principle that men cannot be justly bound by laws in making which they have no part. Persons & property being both essential objects of Government, the most that either can claim, is such a structure of it as will leave a reasonable security for the other. And the most obvious provision, of this double character, seems to be that of confining to the holders of property the object deemed least secure in popular Gov^{ts} the right of suffrage for one of the two Legislative branches. This is not without example among us, as well as other constitutional modifications, favouring the influence of property in the Government. But the U. S. have not reached the stage of Society in which conflicting feelings of the Class with, and the Class without property, have the operation natural to them in Countries fully peopled. The most difficult of all political arrangements is that of so adjusting the claims of the two Classes as to give security to each and to promote the welfare of all. The federal principle,--which enlarges the sphere of power without departing from the elective basis of it and controuls in various ways the propensity in small republics to rash measures & the facility of forming & executing them, will be found the best expedient yet tried for solving the problem."--Madison's Note. * * * * * "Note to the speech of J. M. on the [7^{th}.] day of [August]. "These observations (in the speech of J. M. see debates in the Convention of 1787, on the [7^{th}.] day of [August]) do not convey the speaker's more full & matured view of the subject, which is subjoined. He felt too much at the time the example of Virginia. "The right of suffrage is a fundamental Article in Republican Constitutions. The regulation of it is, at the same time, a task of peculiar delicacy. Allow the right exclusively to property, and the rights of persons may be oppressed. The feudal polity, alone sufficiently proves it. Extend it equally to all, and the rights of property, or the claims of justice, may be overruled by a majority without property or interested in measures of injustice. Of this abundant proof is afforded by other popular Gov^{ts} and is not without examples in our own, particularly in the laws impairing the obligation of contracts.