The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 2Madison, James
History
The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 2
Madison, James
Constitutional law -- United States; Constitutions -- United States; United States. Constitution
Doct^r Franklin expressed his dislike of every thing that tended to
debase the spirit of the common people. If honesty was often the
companion of wealth, and if poverty was exposed to peculiar temptation,
it was not less true that the possession of property increased the
desire of more property. Some of the greatest rogues he was ever
acquainted with, were the richest rogues. We should remember the
character which the Scripture requires in Rulers, that they should be
men hating covetousness. This Constitution will be much read and
attended to in Europe, and if it should betray a great partiality to the
rich will not only hurt us in the esteem of the most liberal and
enlightened men there, but discourage the common people from removing to
this Country.
The Motion of M^r Pinkney was rejected by so general a _no_, that the
States were not called.
M^r Madison was opposed to the Section as vesting an improper &
dangerous power in the Legislature. The qualifications of electors and
elected were fundamental articles in a Republican Gov^t and ought to be
fixed by the Constitution. If the Legislature could regulate those of
either, it can by degrees subvert the Constitution. A Republic may be
converted into an aristocracy or oligarchy as well by limiting the
number capable of being elected, as the number authorized to elect. In
all cases where the representatives of the people will have a personal
interest distinct from that of their Constituents, there was the same
reason for being jealous of them, as there was for relying on them with
full confidence, when they had a common interest. This was one of the
former cases. It was as improper as to allow them to fix their own
wages, or their own privileges. It was a power also which might be made
subservient to the views of one faction ag^{st} another. Qualifications
founded on artificial distinctions may be devised, by the stronger in
order to keep out partizans of a weaker faction.
M^r Elseworth, admitted that the power was not unexceptionable; but he
could not view it as dangerous. Such a power with regard to the electors
would be dangerous because it would be much more liable to abuse.
M^r Gov^r Morris moved to strike out "with regard to property" in order
to leave the Legislature entirely at large.
M^r Williamson. This would surely never be admitted. Should a majority
of the Legislature be composed of any particular description of men, of
lawyers for example, which is no improbable supposition, the future
elections might be secured to their own body.
M^r Madison observed that the British Parliam^t possessed the power of
regulating the qualifications both of the electors, and the elected; and
the abuse they had made of it was a lesson worthy of our attention. They
had made the changes in both cases subservient to their own views, or to
the views of political or Religious parties.
Question on the motion to strike out with regard to property
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