end of the dispute concerning the same being, for the most part, either the taking away of all precepts positive as well as negative, or else the associating of a companion with GOD, by introducing some other independent agent besides him. Those, therefore, who would speak more accurately, use this form: there is neither compulsion nor free liberty, but the way lies between the two; the power and will in man being both created by GOD, though the merit or guilt be imputed unto man. Yet, after all, it is judged the safest way to follow the steps of the primitive Moslems, and, avoiding subtle disputations and too curious inquiries, to leave the knowledge of this matter wholly unto GOD.2 3. As to mortal sin, the Ashárians 3 Auctor Sharh al Tawâlea, apud eund. ibid. p. 248, &c. 1 Idem, ibid. p. 249, 250. 2 Idem, ibid. p. 250, 251. I trust the reader will not be offended if, as a farther illustration of what has been said on this subject (in producing of which I have purposely kept to the original Mohammedan expressions) I transcribe a passage or two from a postscript subjoined to the epistle I have quoted above (§4, p. 85), in which the point of free will is treated ex professo. Therein the Moorish author, having mentioned the two opposite opinions of the Kadarians, who allow free will, and the Jabarians, who make man a necessary agent (the former of which opinions, he says, seems to approach nearest to that of the greater part of Christians and of the Jews), declares the true opinion to be that of the Sonnites, who assert that man hath power and will to choose good and evil, and can moreover know he shall be rewarded if he do well, and shall be punished if he do ill; but that he depends, notwithstanding, on GOD'S power, and shall be punished if he do ill; but that he depends, notwithstanding, on GOD'S power, and willeth, if GOD willeth, but not otherwise. Then he proceeds briefly to refute the two extreme opinions, and first to prove that of the Kadarians, though it be agreeable to GOD'S justice, inconsistent with his attributes of wisdom and power: "Sapientia enim Dei," says he, "comprehendit quicquid fuit et futurum est ab æternitate in finem usque mundi et postea. Et ita novit ab æterno omnia opera creaturarum, sive bona, sive mala, quæ fuerint creata cum potentia Dei, et ejus libera et determinate voluntate, sicut ipsi visum fuit. Denique novit eum qui futurus