taught, that if a believer guilty of such sin die without repentance, his sentence is to be left with GOD, whether he pardon him out of mercy, or whether the prophet intercede for him (according to that saying recorded of him, "My intercession shall be employed for those among my people who shall have been guilty of grievous crimes"), or whether he punish him in proportion to his demerit, and afterwards, through his mercy, admit him into paradise: but that it is not to be supposed he will remain for ever in hell with the infidels, seeing it is declared that whoever shall have faith in his heart but of the weight of an ant, shall be delivered from hell fire.1 And this is generally received for the orthodox doctrine in this point, and is diametrically opposite to that of the Mótazalites. These were the more rational Sefâtians, but the ignorant part of them, not knowing how otherwise to explain the expressions of the Korân relating to the declarative attributes, fell into most gross and erat malus, et tamen creavit: neque negari potest quin, si ipsi libuisset, potuisset omnes creare bonos: placuit tamen Deo creare bonos et malos, cùm Deo soli sit absoluta et libera voluntas, et perfecta electio, et non homini. Ita enim Salomon in suis proverbiis dixit. Vitam et mortem, bonum et malum, divitias et paupertatem, esse et venire à Deo. Christiani etiam dicunt S. Paulum dixisse in suis epistolis; Dicet etiam lutum figulo, quare facis unum vas ad honorem, et aliud vas ad contumeliam? Cum igitur miser homo fuerit creatus à voluntate Dei et potentia, nihil aliud potest tribui ipsi quàm ipse sensus cognoscendi et sentiendi an bene vel male faciat. Quæ unica causa (id est, sensus cognoscendi) erit ejus gloriæ vel ponæ causa: per talem enim sensum novit quid boni vel mali adversus Dei præcepta fecerit." The opinion of the Jabarians, on the other hand, he rejects as contrary to man's consciousness of his own power and choice, and inconsistent with GOD'S justice, and his having given mankind laws, to the observing or transgressing of which he was annexed rewards and punishments. After this he proceeds to explain the third opinion in the following words: "Tertia opinio Zunis (i.e., Sonnitarum) quæ vera est, affirmat homini potesttatem esse, sed limitatem à sua causa, id est, dependentem à Dei potentia et voluntate, et proper illam cognitionem qua deliberat benè vel malè facere, esse dignum pona vel præmio. Manifestum est in æternitate non fuisse aliam potentiam præter Dei nostri omnipotentis, e cujus potentia pendebant omnia possibilia, id est, quæ poterant esse, cum ab ipso fuerint creata. Sapientia verò Dei novit etiam quæ non sunt futura; et potentia ejus, etsi non creaverit ea, potuit tamen, si ita Deo placuisset. Ita novit sapientia Dei quæ erant impossibilia, id est, quæ non poterant esse; quæ tamen nullo pacto pendent ab ejus potentia: ab ejus enim potentia mulla pendent nisi possibilia.-Dicimus enim à Dei potentia non