Between the railway station and the river lies a small stretch of waste ground, a few hundred yards in extent. Here arose the famous “Railway Siding incident.” The Russians claimed it as theirs “by right of conquest,” although it had always been recognised as the property of the railway company. An attempt to construct a siding on it from the station brought matters to a crisis. A Russian guard was promptly mounted on it, and confronted by a detachment of Indian troops under the command of Lieutenant H. E. Rudkin, 20th Bombay Infantry. The situation in which this young subaltern was placed demanded a display of tact and firmness which might well have overtaxed the resources of an older man. But with the self‐reliance which the Indian Army teaches its officers he acquitted himself most creditably in a very trying position. Then ensued a period of anxious suspense when no man knew what the morrow might bring forth. But calm counsels fortunately prevailed. These few yards of waste ground were not judged worth “the bones of a single grenadier,” and the question was taken from the hands of the soldier and entrusted to the diplomat. CHAPTER III THE ALLIED ARMIES IN CHINA To a soldier no city in the world could prove as interesting as Tientsin from the unequalled opportunity it presented of contrasting the men and methods of the Allied Armies. And the officers of the Anglo‐Indian forces saw with pride that they had but little to learn from their Continental brothers‐in‐arms. In organisation, training, and equipment our Indian Army was unsurpassed. Clad in the triple‐proof armour of self‐satisfaction, the soldiers of Europe have rested content in the methods of 1870. The effects of the increased range and destructive power of modern weapons have not been appreciated by them. Close formations are still the rule, and the history of the first few battles in the next European war will be a record of terrible slaughter. The lessons of the Boer campaign are ignored. They ascribe the failures and defeats of the British forces to the defective training and want of _morale_ of our troops, and disdain to learn from a “nation of farmers.” The world has long believed that the German Army is in every respect superior to all others. But those who saw its China expeditionary force—composed though it was of picked troops and carefully selected officers—will not agree with this verdict. Arriving too late for the serious fighting—for there were no German troops in the Allied Army which relieved the Legations—it could only be criticised from its behaviour in garrison and on a few columns which did not meet with very serious opposition. All nationalities had looked forward eagerly to the opportunity of closely observing a portion of the army which has set the fashion in things military to Europe during the past thirty years. But I think that most of those who had hoped to learn from it were disappointed.