It is necessary to set out the section at some length, for it has a googlie element about it and is not so innocent as it appears on the surface. It first sets out "that any Court may commit to prison for six weeks any person who makes default in the payment of a debt or instalment due in pursuance of a judgment." That, of course, is plain sailing imprisonment for debt. Then, however, follows the sub-section--I again apologise for troubling you with all this, but it is really a good citizen's duty to understand it--which causes all the worry. It is enacted in sub-section (2) "that such jurisdiction shall only be exercised where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the person making default either has _or has had_ since the date of the order or judgment the means to pay the sum in respect of which he has made default and has refused or neglected or refuses or neglects to pay the same." It is the words that I have printed in italics that hit the poor man and the weekly wage earner, for of course it is generally provable that, although he has no present means to pay a debt, he _has had_ since the judgment means to pay which he has spent on the maintenance of his family, or, if you will, on beer or tobacco, or picture palaces, or, in a word, as good solvent middle class people would say--improvidently. The further matters enacted are all sensible enough, granted you approve of the main principle of imprisonment for small debtors. They deal with proof of means of the person making default, allowing such proof to be given in such manner as the Court thinks just, and for these purposes the debtor and any witnesses may be summoned and examined on oath according to the prescribed rules. The other material points of the section are that a County Court judge must exercise his jurisdiction in open Court, he may order the debt to be paid by instalments, he may also make continuous committals on each unpaid instalment, he may vary and rescind the order, and the imprisonment when suffered does not distinguish or discharge the debt or other remedies of the creditor. The debtor can take his release in payment of debt and costs. Anyone who studies this Act of 1869 and comes to the conclusion that this system is anything less than imprisonment for debt, and not imprisonment for fraud, must, I think, be driven to argue that the men who drafted the Act called the Act an Act for the abolition of imprisonment for debt, called section 5 a saving clause for continuing imprisonment for small debtors in certain cases, and did not understand their business. As a matter of fact they knew their business very well indeed, and they carried it out faithfully and well.