"It has happened, since the world has grown more commercial, that a practice has crept in of admitting particular relaxations; and if _one_ state only is at war, no injury is committed to any other state. It is of no importance to other nations how much a _single_ belligerent chooses to weaken and dilute his _own_ rights; but it is otherwise when allied nations are pursuing a common cause against a common enemy. Between them it must be taken as an implied, if not an express contract, that one state shall not do anything to defeat the general object. If one state admits its subjects to carry on an uninterrupted trade with the enemy, the consequence may be that it will supply aid and _comfort_ to the enemy; especially if it is an enemy very materially depending on the resources of foreign commerce, which may be injurious to the prosecution of the common cause, _and the interests of its ally_. It should seem that it is not enough, therefore, to say that one state has allowed this practice to its own subjects; it should appear to be at least desirable, that it could be shown that the practice is of such a nature that it can in no way interfere with the common operations, or that it has the allowance of the confederate state."[213] Trade with the enemy has always been held to be a direct interference with the common operations of the war, and indirect trade has been regarded with as much jealousy as direct trade. If Lord Stowell is to be trusted, this country cannot in any way waive its belligerent rights, without the consent of its ally; so that it is quite in the option of France at any time to withdraw its assent, or to modify it in terms, and thus bind English merchants to the terms of their assent. The _intended_ effect of these Orders is well described in the _Times_, of April 21st, 1854.