The old question therefore arises: _Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?_ which I should like here to translate freely by: Who will keep in order those who are to keep the world in order? A League of Nations which can only be kept together by a powerful International Army and Navy, is a contradiction in itself; for the independence and equality of the member States of the League would soon disappear. It is a fact--I make this statement although I am sure it will be violently contradicted--that, just as hitherto, so within a League of Nations some kind of Balance of Power only can guarantee the independence and equality of the smaller States. For the Community of Power, on which the League of Nations must rest, would at once disappear if one or two members of the League became so powerful that they could disregard the combined power of the other members. Every scheme of this movement must therefore see to it that no member of the League is more armed than is necessary considering the extent of its territory and other factors concerned. But be that as it may, an International Army and Navy is practically impossible, just as a Federal World State is impossible. XIII. Yet while a Federal World State is impossible, a League of Nations is not, provided such league gives itself a constitution, not of a state-like character, but one _sui generis_. What can be done is this: the hitherto unorganised Family of Nations can organise itself on simple lines so as to secure, on the one hand, the absolute independence of every State, and, on the other hand, the peaceful co-existence of all the States. It is possible, in my opinion, to establish an International Court of Justice before which the several States engage to appear in case a conflict arises between two or more of them which can be judicially settled, that is, can be settled by a rule of law. There is as little reason why two or more States should go to war on account of a conflict which can be settled upon the basis of law, as there is for two private individuals to resort to arms in case of a dispute between them which can be decided by a Court of Law. Again, although there will frequently arise between States conflicts of a political character which cannot be settled on the basis of a rule of law, there is no reason why, when the States in conflict cannot settle them by diplomatic negotiation, they should resort to arms, before bringing the conflict before some Council of Conciliation and giving the latter an opportunity of investigating the matter and proposing a fair compromise. Under modern conditions of civilisation the whole world suffers in case war breaks out between even only two States, and for this reason it is advisable that the rest of the world should unite and oppose such State as would resort to arms without having submitted its case to an International Court of Justice or an International Council of Conciliation.