If a General is superseded in his command in the hour of victory he does not become a mere aide-de-camp or secretary to the officer by whom he has been superseded. In conducting a negociation, he stands rather in the position of an ambassador, who, though he may not have full power himself, is still held to be mainly responsible for the treaty that he signs. If Sir Arthur only signed the Convention _officially_, he ought, for the sake of his own character, at once to have remonstrated openly against all the terms of which he disapproved and which tarnished the splendour of his victory. The obvious conclusion to be drawn from his signature of the Convention was that, the opportunity of following up the victory having been lost, the surrender of Lisbon and the evacuation of the whole of Portugal by the French troops were advantages too great to be rejected and left to the uncertain decision of arms. But whatever may have been his private opinion, he was fortunate to rise superior to the disgrace which fell upon his commanding officers, probably because the victory of Vimiera must have served to open the eyes of our Government to the folly of submitting a man of his abilities to the command of Generals higher in rank but far inferior in military experience. It can but appear singular that a General should be superseded in his command in the very moment of battle, and that, before his successor had time to grasp the reins of power, the latter should in turn be himself succeeded, by yet another commander! It affords an extraordinary instance either of indecision or of intrigue in the Cabinet!... Suffice it to say that this Triumvirate produced as a monument to their glory the Convention of Cintra!