Events justified the accuracy of Mr. Hayward’s information, for it was the fatal error of Lord Beaconsfield’s policy that it assumed there was no genuine accord among the Powers, and that they were neither able nor willing to prevent Russia from seizing Turkish territory in Europe. Indeed, Mr. Hayward seems to have been the only observer of public affairs who clearly understood why they were drifting in the direction indicated by the table-talk of the embassies. In a letter to Lady Waldegrave (7th October, 1876) he says, “the power of public opinion is a remarkable feature of the Eastern Question. Russia is so strongly impelled by it that the Government would be endangered by holding back. Austria is impelled by the Magyar to oppose the construction of any new Slav State. The Porte is afraid of exasperating its Mahometan subjects by what might be deemed unworthy concessions. The English Government is completely controlled by public opinion.” And again in a letter to Mr. Gladstone he says, “One of the strongest features of the situation is, that the popular voice or national will is bettering or impelling diplomacy and statesmanship in Russia, Austria, England, and Turkey, and [Illustration: THE TOWER OF GALATA, CONSTANTINOPLE.] fortunately so as concerns England. Whatever England is doing in the right direction is owing to the popular impulse for which you are mainly responsible, and which will redound to your lasting honour.”[113] At the same time, there was a point at which Mr. Gladstone and the nation parted company. He thought that if England admitted that she ought to see that the Bulgarians were protected from oppression, she ought to force Turkey to give effectual guarantees for their protection. If she did not, Russia would step in as their champion, and establish a claim to exclusive influence over European Turkey, which it was not politic to give her even a pretext for exercising. The great majority of Englishmen, however, held (1), that it was not their business to waste their taxes in winning freedom for the Bulgarians; (2), that they sufficiently discharged their duty to them when they paralysed Turkey by withdrawing British support from her; and (3), that the futile results of the Crimean War proved that Austria and Germany, from their geographical position, were the only Powers who could be safely trusted to effectively check Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. The masses, as distinguished from the aristocratic and academic classes, here proved themselves wiser than their leaders, on whom they forced a policy of non-intervention, which practically meant benevolent neutrality to the oppressed provinces of Turkey. The manner in which the Treaty of San Stefano was transformed into the Treaty of Berlin, every concession extorted from Russia being obviously exacted in Austro-German interests, more than justified the somewhat cynical anticipations of the British people.