It is not necessary to describe at length the steps which led up to the outbreak of war between Russia and Turkey on the 23rd of April, 1877. In vain did Lord Derby implore Turkey to grant of her own free will the concessions she had refused to the abortive Conference. Russia stood grimly on the frontier, with her hand on her sword-hilt, asking Europe how long she was to wait ere she unsheathed her weapon. In March a Protocol was signed by the Powers pressing Turkey to yield. To this Russia appended a declaration that she would disarm if Turkey accepted the advice of the Powers, and also sent an ambassador to St. Petersburg to arrange for mutual disarmament. But otherwise Russia clearly indicated her intention to use force. Lord Derby accepted, as did the other Powers, this declaration, only he added, on behalf of England, a reservation that she would consider the instrument null and void if it did not lead to disarmament. The Turks rejected the appeal of the Protocol. Prince Bismarck rejected a personal appeal which the Queen made to him to hold back Russia; and so war was declared. To the last the Turks expected that England would take their side, and they had been confirmed in their attitude of contumacy by the appointment of Mr. Layard, a notorious supporter of Turkey, to the British Embassy at Constantinople on the day on which the Protocol was signed. If it was the object of Lord Beaconsfield to prevent the outbreak of war and to save the Ottoman Empire in Europe from ruin, his policy must be described as an utter failure. And it failed for obvious reasons. Lord Beaconsfield and the British diplomatic agents in Turkey talked and wrote in terms which persuaded the Turks that, if they resisted the demands of Europe, England would defend them, as in 1853-4. On the contrary, if Lord Beaconsfield desired the Foreign Policy of England to succeed, and to save Turkey from being crushed by Russia, he should have taken steps to convince her that, even if he had the will, he had not the power to do battle for her.