he made a “palpable hit” in detecting the inadequacy of Mr. Cardwell’s scheme of National Defence, sedulously avoided justifying the sale of commissions in the army. He based his objection to the abolition of Purchase on the ground that it would involve “the most wicked, the most wanton, the most uncalled for waste of the public money.” Here we have depicted a vivid contrast between the House of Commons of the Second, and the House of the Third Reform Bill. In these latter days Lord Wemyss--who in 1871 was Lord Elcho--would hardly venture to obstruct any measure of reform because there was tacked on to it a scheme for compensating “vested interests” too generously. The Representatives of the People would now meet such an objection by simply cutting down the compensation. And Mr. Cardwell had an excellent opportunity for doing this ready to his hands. The money paid for commissions was far above the regulation price, and yet it was a statutory offence punishable by two years’ imprisonment to pay over-regulation prices. In fact, Parliament may be said to have betrayed the country in this transaction. Not only had it connived at the offence of paying over-regulation money, but it made its connivance a pretext for compensating the offenders for the loss of advantages they had gained by breaking the law. Only two arguments worthy of the least attention were brought forward by the Opposition. The first was that abolition of Purchase would weaken the regimental system. For it was contended that promotion by selection for officers above the rank of captain--which was the substitute proposed for promotion by Purchase--involving, as it did, transfers from one regiment to another, must destroy the regimental home-life.[4] The second was, that it would tend to create a professional military caste, who might, as Mr. Bernal Osborne argued, prove dangerous to the liberties of the people. It was, however, felt that it was absurd to sacrifice the efficiency of the Army to its regimental home life, and that one of the strongest objections to the Purchase system was that it rendered the Army amateurish rather than professional. But in the long controversy that raged through the Session no argument told more effectively than Mr. Trevelyan’s citation of Havelock’s bitter complaint that “he was sick for years in waiting for promotion, that three sots and two fools had purchased over him, and that if he had not had a family to support he would not have served another hour.” Mr. Cardwell, too, left nothing to be said when he told the House of Commons that Army reformers were paralysed by Purchase. Every proposal for change was met by the argument that it affected the position of officers who had paid for that position. In fact, the British Army was literally held in pawn by its officers, and the nation had virtually no control over it whilst it was in that ignominious position. The debate, which seemed interminable, ended in