As far back as the 17th of October, 1870, Sir Andrew Buchanan told Lord Granville that the Czar, in his private letters to King William of Prussia, had expressed a hope that no French territory would be annexed. On the 4th of November the Italian Minister informed Lord Granville that whilst Italy admitted that French fortresses must be surrendered to the Germans, yet she held that there should be no cession of territory. Sir A. Paget, writing from Florence, also conveyed to Lord Granville about the same time the views of Signor Visconti to the effect that “the Italian Government had several times expressed the opinion that a peace in which Germany would seek her guarantees by the dismantling of fortresses, &c., would afford better securities for its duration than one which would be likely to create a new question of nationalities.” Here there was a basis for a joint representation on the part of the European Powers--for Austria all through had only been held back through fear of Russia--both to France and Germany. France might have been warned that, in spite of M. Jules Favre’s formula,[22] she, as the defeated aggressor, had no right to object to her menacing strongholds being razed. Germany might have been reminded that, in the interests not of France but of Europe, it was her duty as a great and civilising Power not to demand a cession of territory, the recovery of which must be to France an object of ceaseless striving. The Queen would gladly have used her personal influence with the German Emperor in urging on the Court of Berlin the policy and justice of this representation. Lord Granville’s subordinates had assured him that France, despite M. Favre’s heroics, would agree to anything if spared the surrender of territory. It is now known that even Bismarck himself was not desirous of the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine against the will of their inhabitants.[23] The German generals had, however, claimed what they deemed a safe, military frontier, and though Von Bismarck induced them not to insist on the cession of Belfort, he could not repel their demand for Alsace, a third part of Lorraine, and Metz and Strasburg. The German Crown Prince was, moreover, understood to be opposed to any irritating and unnecessary annexation. Hence all the chances were in favour of success, if Lord Granville, acting with Russia and Italy, had approached Germany with a cordial and courteous appeal, to reject the advice of her military party, and moderate their demands in the interests of Europe.[24] But the golden opportunity of strengthening Von Bismarck’s hands was lost. Lord Granville not only refused to abandon his attitude of rigid neutrality, but he couched his policy in phrases so ostentatiously deferential to Germany, that they almost justified the half-contemptuous replies which Von Bismarck at this time sent to all despatches from the English Foreign Office, which he did not entirely ignore. In February, 1871, when Lord