As, according to the fundamental idea of his philosophy with regard to the threefold nature of man, soul and spirit may indeed act together, but at the same time they exist separate from one another, and, being by no means identical, the Prince could not assent to the dicta of the so-called Philosophers of Identity (_Identitats Philosophen_). The latter assert the identity of nature and spirit; they look upon the human mind as being evolved from the divine, and upon the soul as being evolved from the mind; he therefore rejected the Pantheistic as well as the philosophical systems of Schelling and Hegel, and classed himself with those philosophers whom Schelling called _Reflections menschen_, _i.e._, thinkers who, according to the ordinary view, retain the contrast between the inner and the outer worlds, between internal and external phenomena, between perceptions and things, thinking and being, but who consider any knowledge going beyond this, and endeavouring to overcome this contrast by comprehending the unity of all things, to be impossible. His views were similar to those of Kant. Prince Herman therefore felt himself specially attracted towards the Königsberg philosopher, who in his critical works had so accurately and carefully distinguished the intellectual or spiritual world from the sensuous, the essence of things or the things-in-themselves from the phenomena. Only with respect to the free will of man he felt unable to follow the teaching of Kant, who, while declaring the essence of man as well as of things in general to lie beyond the range of knowledge, asserted the same with regard to that moral freedom which (as the Prince thought) should reveal itself to us by means of moral self-examination and become practically intelligible. Here Prince Herman thought he perceived a contradiction which he set himself to remove. With that object he wrote and published an essay entitled “The Results of an Examination of Kant’s Doctrine of Free Will.” To refute the objections he encountered, he defended his point of view in a pamphlet published shortly before his death under the title “_Replik und Duplik_.” It had been his endeavour to give an explanation of human free will, and the objection had been made that his doctrine was “Determinism.” That doctrine, briefly expressed, was as follows. Free will, properly understood, consists in the liberty of will or choice, that is, in the power of choosing one among several possibilities or motives of action, which presupposes the power of reflection, of consideration, or of doubt. If man were omniscient, he would not have to reflect or to consider. Divine omniscience excludes free will, whereas human ignorance includes free will. Because the greater part of the conditions under which we act remains hidden to us, we act without knowing our dependence, and imagine a limited number of possibilities from among which we may choose. Consequently we cannot