On the 20th Labouchere wrote again to Mr. Chamberlain: "From all I hear, matters are in a mess in Egypt. Tewfik is a weak creature, and he and his entourage intrigue against us, and yet intrigue to keep us there, as they are afraid of what may happen when we go. If the fellahs have any opinion, it is dislike of Tewfik as the puppet of 'foreigners.' The Mahdi will never attack Egypt proper, which is the valley of the Nile and the Delta. If we send more troops there, it will be the more difficult to evacuate. As long as we retain a corporal's guard, it will be the object of Tewfik and all the locusts to get up disturbances in order to compromise us. Surely it would be easy to come to an arrangement by which Egypt would be neutralised and left to itself: the reply always is that interest of the debt would not be paid and that, in consequence of the Law of Liquidation, some Power would interfere for the benefit of its Egyptian bondholders. But these worthy people must be comparatively few in numbers, and except as a pretext, no Power would think of taking up the cudgels for them, any more {212} than they did for Peruvian bondholders. The whole thing is a mere bugbear. Even if France did go there we should not suffer." To which Mr. Chamberlain replied on December 22: "I think I agree with you on all points of Egyptian policy, but my hands are so full just now that I have to let foreign affairs work themselves out, and to content myself with occasionally giving a push in the right direction."