Never has the Radical view of the House of Lords and the Crown been more forcibly expressed than in the following: "The Whigs seem to know that ---- is in favour of the abolition of a House of hereditary legislators. Let us hope that they are correct. We are frequently told that the {231} people love, honour, and respect the House of Lords. Let any one who entertains this notion allude to this assembly at a popular political gathering in any part of the country, and he will find his illusion rudely dispelled. There are earnest Radicals who hold that there ought to be two legislative Chambers, and not one; although why they think so, it is difficult to say, for in every country where the two-Chamber system prevails, either one of them has become a mere useless court of registration, or the two are engaged in perpetual disputes, to the great detriment of public business. No Radical, however, is in favour of our existing Upper Chamber. If he were, he would not be a Radical. What an hereditary legislator ought to be is well described by Burke in his letter to the Duke of Bedford. What our hereditary legislators are we know by bitter experience. They almost all belong to one particular class--that of the great landlords. When any attempt is made to deal with the gross absurdities of our land system, they rally almost to a man to its defence, not from natural depravity, but from the natural bias of every one to consider that what benefits him must be for the best. The majority of them are Conservatives; even those who call themselves Liberals are the mildest of Whigs. When a Conservative Administration is in power they are harmless for good or evil. When a Liberal Administration is in power they are actively evil. Such an administration represents the deliberate will of the nation. Before bringing in a Bill, however, it has to be toned down, lest it should meet with opposition in the Lords. Nevertheless it does meet with opposition there. The Lords do not throw it out, but emasculate it with amendments; then when it comes back to the Commons a bargain is struck that, if the Commons will agree to some of these amendments, the Lords will not insist upon the others. Thus, no matter what may be the majority possessed by a Liberal ministry in the House of Commons, it can never legislate as it wishes, but in a sense between what it wishes and what the Conservative {232} majority in the Lords wish. In great and important questions it almost always obeys its Leader like a flock of sheep, and thus one man is able to provoke a dissolution, not only when he thinks that this is in the interests of the country, but when he imagines it to be in the interests of his party. It is asserted that the House of Lords is useful because its rejection of a Bill is an appeal to the country against a House of Commons which is acting in opposition to the popular will. It is not easy to understand on