The veto of the Civil Rights Bill and the struggle over its passage the second time precipitated the exciting contest at the polls in the autumn of 1866. In that campaign Trumbull held the foremost position in the Republican column. Whether it was possible to avoid the conflict we cannot now say. It was most desirable that the party in power should march all one way, and hence that the President should respond to the friendly overtures of the leaders in Congress. When he found that he could not approve the two bills that the Senator had placed in his hands for examination, he ought to have sent for him and pointed out his objections and at all events expressed regret that he could not concur with him in the particulars where they disagreed. Then there might have been mutual concessions leading to harmony. In any event, there would have been no sting left behind, no hard feeling, no sense of injury, and perhaps no rupture in the party. That was not Johnson's way. He lacked _savoir faire_. He was combative by nature. He not only made personal enemies unnecessarily, but he alienated thousands who wished to be his friends.[91] "Many persons," says a not unfriendly critic, "whose feelings were proof against the appeals made on behalf of the freedmen and loyalists were carried over to the side of Congress by sheer disgust at Johnson's performances. The alienation, by the President, of this essentially thoughtful and conservative element of the Northern voters was as disastrous and inexcusable as the alienation of those moderate men in Congress whom he had repelled by his narrow and obstinate policy in regard to the Freedmen's Bureau and Civil Rights Bills. It was again demonstrated that Andrew Johnson was not a statesman of national size in such a crisis as existed in 1866."[92] On the other hand, it must be admitted that Johnson was within his constitutional right in vetoing the bills without previously consulting anybody in Congress. The Civil Rights Act came before the Circuit Court of the United States twice, soon after it was enacted, and in both instances was held to be constitutional. The circuit courts were then presided over by Justices of the Supreme Court. In the case of United States _v._ Rhodes, Seventh Circuit, District of Kentucky, 1866, before Justice Swayne, the act was pronounced constitutional in all its provisions, and held to be an appropriate method of exercising the power conferred on Congress by the Thirteenth Amendment. The other case was the Matter of Turner, Fourth Circuit, Maryland, October Term, 1867, before Chief Justice Chase. This case was submitted to the court without argument. The Chief Justice expressed regret that it was not accompanied by arguments of counsel, but he decided that the act was constitutional and that it applied to all conditions prohibited by it, whether originating in transactions before, or since, its enactment.[93]