If either of these cases had been taken to the Supreme Court on appeal, at that time, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 would doubtless have been upheld by that body; yet in October, 1882, the court held by unanimous vote that none of the latest amendments of the Constitution (the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth) did more than put prohibition on the action of the states. No state should have slavery; no state should make any law to abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; no state should deny the right of voting by reason of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The power of Congress to go into the states to enforce the criminal law against individuals had not been granted in any of these amendments. It could not be affirmed that the second section of the Thirteenth Amendment gave power to Congress to legislate for the states as to other matters than actual slavery. But the Civil Rights Act applied to all the states--to those where slavery had never existed as well as to those where it had been recently abolished.[94] The act which the court in October, 1882, pronounced unconstitutional was the Anti-Ku-Klux Act of 1871. Trumbull himself spoke and voted against that act believing it to be unconstitutional, as we shall see later. He drew the line somewhere between the two acts. The judges participating in the decision in the Harris case were Chief Justice Waite and Associate Justices Miller, Bradley, Woods, Gray, Field, Harlan, Matthews, and Blatchford. One year later the court held that the Equal Rights Act of March 1, 1875, which gave to all persons full and equal enjoyment of accommodations and privileges of inns, public conveyances, theatres, and other places of public amusement, common schools and public institutions of learning or benevolence supported in whole or in part by general taxation, was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court still consisted of the Justices above named.[95] It held that the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution related only to slavery and its incidents and that the Fourteenth Amendment was merely prohibitory on the states; that is, that it did not confer additional powers upon Congress, but merely forbade discriminating acts on the part of the states. The opinion of the court was delivered by Justice Bradley. The only dissenting opinion was given by Justice Harlan, of Kentucky, who held that the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution was not restricted to the prohibition of slavery, but that it conferred upon Congress the power to make freedom effectual to the former victims of slavery. He said: