In the course of the six months that intervened between the 13th of May (date of the Berlin Note) and the meeting of the Conference in December, an apparent contradiction seems to manifest itself between the “intimate alliance” of the three Northern Powers (which for the purpose of these negotiations means between Austria and Russia), and the frictions and disagreements between their respective Governments. On no less than five points did this disagreement manifest itself: (1) as to whether Turkey should be coerced into an armistice, pure and simple, with Servia, or whether a basis of peace should, at the same time as the armistice, be proposed;[56] (2) as to inculcating prudence of conduct on Servia;[57] (3) as to the joint occupation with Russia of the Turkish provinces;[58] (4) as to the “autonomy” of the revolted provinces;[59] (5) on the question of the Conference.[60] On the other hand, we have seen Count Beust calling at the Foreign Office to assure Lord Derby that never was the alliance of the three Northern Powers so “intimate”; we have the meeting of Reichstadt, and General Soumarakoff delivering an autograph letter from the Czar to the Emperor of Austria, and we have a very mysterious communication from Lord A. Loftus on the 15th August 1876, in which he says: “In speaking of Austria, Prince Gortchakoff again repeated to me that he had fully discussed the question of a pacification with Count Andrassy, and _that they were entirely agreed on all points and for all eventualities_. ‘I can state no more,’ said the Chancellor, ‘but that much I can tell you, as I have done to your Colleagues; and I can add that our Ambassadors at the other Courts know no more than you do.’ This language,” continues Lord A. Loftus, “though, perhaps, satisfactory ... is mysterious, and we can only unravel the mystery by conjectures.”[61]