The Life of Reason: The Phases of Human ProgressSantayana, George
Philosophy
The Life of Reason: The Phases of Human Progress
Santayana, George
Philosophy
Pleasures differ sensibly in intensity; but the intensest pleasures are
often the blindest, and it is hard to recall or estimate a feeling with
which no definite and complex object is conjoined. The first step in
making pleasure intelligible and capable of being pursued is to make it
pleasure in something. The object it suffuses acquires a value, and
gives the pleasure itself a place in rational life. The pleasure can now
be named, its variations studied in reference to changes in its object,
and its comings and goings foreseen in the order of events. The more
articulate the world that produces emotion the more controllable and
recoverable is the emotion itself. Therefore diversity and order in
ideas makes the life of pleasure richer and easier to lead. A voluminous
dumb pleasure might indeed outweigh the pleasure spread thin over a
multitude of tame perceptions, if we could only weigh the two in one
scale; but to do so is impossible, and in memory and prospect, if not in
experience, diversified pleasure must needs carry the day.
[Sidenote: Subhuman delights.]
Here we come upon a crisis in human development which shows clearly how
much the Life of Reason is a natural thing, a growth that a different
course of events might well have excluded. Laplace is reported to have
said on his death-bed that science was mere trifling and that nothing
was real but love. Love, for such a man, doubtless involved objects and
ideas: it was love of persons. The same revulsion of feeling may,
however, be carried further. Lucretius says that passion is a torment
because its pleasures are not pure, that is, because they are mingled
with longing and entangled in vexatious things. Pure pleasure would be
without ideas. Many a man has found in some moment of his life an
unutterable joy which made all the rest of it seem a farce, as if a
corpse should play it was living. Mystics habitually look beneath the
Life of Reason for the substance and infinity of happiness. In all these
revulsions, and many others, there is a certain justification, inasmuch
as systematic living is after all an experiment, as is the formation of
animal bodies, and the inorganic pulp out of which these growths have
come may very likely have had its own incommunicable values, its
absolute thrills, which we vainly try to remember and to which, in
moments of dissolution, we may half revert. Protoplasmic pleasures and
strains may be the substance of consciousness; and as matter seeks its
own level, and as the sea and the flat waste to which all dust returns
have a certain primordial life and a certain sublimity, so all passions
and ideas, when spent, may rejoin the basal note of feeling, and enlarge
their volume as they lose their form. This loss of form may not be
unwelcome, if it is the formless that, by anticipation, speaks through
what is surrendering its being. Though to acquire or impart form is
delightful in art, in thought, in generation, in government, yet a
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