Our attention has hitherto been too exclusively directed to Lord Clive's civil and military reforms, to admit of any connected view of the very important treaties which he negotiated with the native powers, and which really changed the face of India. We have seen that one of his first objects, after his arrival in Bengal, was to conclude a peace with Sujah-u-Dowlah, the Vizier, Nabob of Oude, and to make some arrangement with our ally, the King. The war, though successful, had long been carried on at an expense ruinous to the Company's finances. With these objects he resolved to combine a settlement with the young Nabob of Bengal (whose finances were in disorder), so as to place his and the Company's affairs on a definite and solid basis. Clive had left Calcutta on the afternoon of the 25th of June, 1765, and on the 9th of July writes to the Select Committee, that the business of Nujm-u-Dowlah's durbar was perfectly finished. By the arrangement then entered into, provision was made for the management of public affairs at the Nabob's court, and in the three provinces, the immediate administration of which was committed to Mahommed Reza Khan, Doolubram, and Jugget Seit, and regulations were signed by them and the Nabob for that purpose. A barrier was thus provided against the shifting policy and intrigues of a corrupt court, and a weak and ignorant prince. At the same time Lord Clive procured from the Nabob a sunnud for the reversion in perpetuity of his jaghire to the Company. But he now plainly saw that things could not stop where they were. The truth is, that it was now clear enough, that two independent governments could not exist in the country at the same time. The one must swallow up the other; and the Company having the sword in their hand, and not being disposed to recede, it was necessary to reduce the Nabob to a cipher. Two days afterwards[91] Clive writes to the Select Committee;--"We have often lamented that the gentlemen of the Council, by precipitating the late treaty, had lost the most glorious opportunity that could ever happen of settling matters upon that solid and advantageous footing for the Company, which no temporary invasion could endanger. The true and only security for our commerce and territorial possessions in this country is, in a manner, always to have it in our power to overawe the very Nabob we are bound by treaty to support. A maxim contrary to this has of late been much adopted; and from that fundamental error, as I may call it, have sprung the innumerable evils, or at least deficiencies, in our government, which, I have now the pleasure to inform you, are in a fair way of being perfectly removed.