In each case the ambition of Russia is the motive power, and in each she seeks to play her game with as little risk, and as much gain, as possible. In neither will she fight, if she can avoid the necessity, yet in each there is a point beyond which her honour and her interests alike refuse to permit her to remain concealed and neutral. The solution of the two questions is being worked out simultaneously, and the progress of the Afghan question will at least very seriously affect the later stages of the Kuldja. If Russia has to fight to defend Shere Ali, then we may be sure that Tso Tsung Tang's legions will not remain inactive, and that General Kolpakovsky will either have to beat a retreat to Vernoe, or engage in a war out of which, on his own resources alone, it will be impossible for him to issue victorious. If Russia interfere openly in defence of Shere Ali, Kuldja must be restored to the Chinese, otherwise Russia's flank would be exposed to a crushing blow, which the Chinese would not be slow to take advantage of. Present events on the Ili and on the Cabul have, therefore, this much in common, that they both aim, directly or indirectly, at the fabric of Russian supremacy in Central Asia. The occupation of Afghanistan by England, or even a partial occupation of it as is very probable, would seriously weaken Russian prestige in Western Turkestan. A Chinese occupation of Kuldja would undermine her position in Vernoe and Naryn and among the Kirghiz. Admitting these, is it not natural to suppose that in each case Russia will fight, or that, even if she does not fight in each case, she will fight in the one that she may deem of the most importance? But we need not pursue the subject farther. The Chinese are face to face with Russia in the heart of Central Asia, just as a few short months ago they were opposed to Yakoob Beg and the power of the Tungani.