The thoots are considered as the instructions orally delivered by Gaudama himself, either to his disciples in private, or to the assembled multitudes, during the forty-five years of his public mission. In this collection the disciples have learned the doctrines of the master, and found all the elements necessary to compose all the treaties, which subsequently have formed the collections called Wini Pitagat and Abidama Pitagat. No one could ever believe that the author of Buddhism could have busied himself in writing treatises on metaphysics, or minutely and elaborately publishing the regulations under which the body of his followers, called the Sanga, were to live and spend their time. In his instructions Gaudama gave utterance to certain principles, which, being appropriated by his disciples and their successors, were enlarged, developed, and reduced to the shape of a treatise. In fact, he sowed the seed which, being let into the soil of the mind of enthusiastic disciples, grew up and multiplied into the voluminous above-named collections. Genuine Buddhism must be found in the thoots of the oldest stamp. Anywhere else we meet with the Buddhism such as it has been developed by doctors and commentators. There are four collections of the thoots, named Nidia Nike, Midzima Nike, Thangoutta Nike, and Engouttara Nike. They are likewise arranged under fifteen heads, called: Koudakapata, Dammapata, Oodana, Ithi, Wouthaka, Thouttanibat, Wi, Mama-wouttoo, Pita-wouttoo, Terakatta, Terikatta, Dzattakani, Piti-sambika, Apadana, Buddha-wattoo. The Abidamma has seven divisions, viz., Dammathingakani, Wittin, Datoogatta, Pouggala-pignia, Kathawattoo, Yamaik, Patan. The attentive reader cannot be but surprised to see how the three great divisions of the Buddhistic scriptures are mentioned by the members of the first council as things already existing and arranged with the same method as they have been disposed during succeeding ages. It is certain that such divisions of Gaudama’s doctrines did not then exist at that time. Are we to conclude therefrom that the fact of the holding of the first council is to be rejected as a mere invention, because the mode of relating some particulars concerning that great assembly is liable to be seriously objected to? It seems that such a conclusion would be a too hasty one.