The consequences are the same as heretofore: discontent and remonstrance, and a proclamation to all Europe, showing how easy it would be to dismember the United Kingdom. No loyalty will reconcile rational beings to preserve an evil which they can exchange for a good; so that those who make Ireland poor and enslaved, set before her, above all other men, the advantages of separation. What can create a desire for this remedy but ill-treatment? And so long as this treatment lasts, how shall that desire discontinue? They stand in the relation of cause and effect, and will for ever go on, or cease together. It was the opinion of Emmet, that the legislative union was a measure more suited to facilitate the despotism of the ministry than to strengthen the dominion of England. Since the abuse of power has always followed excess, no less in nations than individuals, a restraint upon human actions is salutary for all parties, and the impediment that shall stop the career of ministerial tyranny, will be found to work best for the stability of the connexion. If this operate to the good of Ireland, she will observe it for its utility, an Irish parliament being then its best preservative. If, on the contrary, it be made, as at present, to sacrifice the many for the few, it will be viewed as a curse by the Irish people—an evil that must be got rid of rather than a good to be embraced and cherished. At present we see those persons who deny a parliament to Ireland on which to rest her peace and happiness, self-poised and self-protected; we see them sedulous to change the state of the question, and to represent the repeal of the legislative union as a schism in the government. They would limit the people of Ireland entirely to England for benefits—whence, then, have come their wrongs? An Irish parliament, on the contrary, would be a bond of liberal connexion; it would settle every question of domestic policy at home, prevent strife and recrimination between both countries, secure to the affairs of Ireland, a degree of attention which however necessary, they do not and cannot obtain among the weighty concerns of a different people, in a foreign legislature. It would remove the old opprobrious evil of legislation without representation; for wherever this is partial and foreign, it is inadequate: as relates to Ireland, it is worthless mockery. Why was a borough-constituency vicious, but because it sent men to make laws for the people who did not represent the people, who were returned by a different body, and intent upon serving themselves and their employers.