The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
9. (II.) But supposing that it were possible to strike
a sort of average of this fluctuating state, should we find this
average to be of the amount assigned by theory? In other
words, is our natural belief in the happening of two different
events in direct proportion to the frequency with which those
events happen in the long run? There is a lottery with 100
tickets and ten prizes; is a man's belief that he will get a
prize fairly represented by one-tenth of certainty? The mere
reference to a lottery should be sufficient to disprove this.
Lotteries have flourished at all times, and have never failed
to be abundantly supported, in spite of the most perfect conviction,
on the part of many, if not of most, of those who put
into them, that in the long run all will lose. Deductions
should undoubtedly be made for those who act from superstitious
motives, from belief in omens, dreams, and so on.
But apart from these, and supposing any one to come fortified
by all that mathematics can do for him, it is difficult to
believe that his natural impressions about single events would
be always what they should be according to theory. Are
there many who can honestly declare that they would have
no desire to buy a single ticket? They would probably say
to themselves that the sum they paid away was nothing
worth mentioning to lose, and that there was a chance of
gaining a great deal; in other words, they are not apportioning
their belief in the way that theory assigns.
What bears out this view is, that the same persons who
would act in this way in single instances would often not
think of doing so in any but single instances. In other
words, the natural tendency here is to attribute too great an
amount of belief where it is or should be small; i.e. to depreciate
the risk in proportion to the contingent advantage.
They would very likely, when argued with, attach disparaging
epithets to this state of feeling, by calling it an unaccountable
fascination, or something of that kind, but of
its existence there can be little doubt. We are speaking
now of what is the natural tendency of our minds, not of
that into which they may at length be disciplined by education
and thought. If, however, educated persons have succeeded
for the most part in controlling this tendency in
games of chance, the spirit of reckless speculation has
scarcely yet been banished from commerce. On examination,
this tendency will be found so prevalent in all ages, ranks,
and dispositions, that it would be inadmissible to neglect it in
order to bring our supposed instincts more closely into accordance
with the commonly received theories of Probability.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account