10. There is another aspect of this question which has been often overlooked, but which seems to deserve some attention. Granted that we have an instinct of credence, why should it be assumed that this must be just of that intensity which subsequent experience will justify? Our instincts are implanted in us for good purposes, and are intended to act immediately and unconsciously. They are, however, subject to control, and have to be brought into accordance with what we believe to be true and right. In other departments of psychology we do not assume that every spontaneous prompting of nature is to be left just as we find it, or even that on the average, omitting individual variations, it is set at that pitch that will be found in the end to be the best when we come to think about it and assign its rules. Take, for example, the case of resentment. Here we have an instinctive tendency, and one that on the whole is good in its results. But moralists are agreed that almost all our efforts at self-control are to be directed towards subduing it and keeping it in its right direction. It is assumed to be given as a sort of rough protection, and to be set, if one might so express oneself, at too high a pitch to be deliberately and consciously acted on in society. May not something of this kind be the case also with our belief? I only make a passing reference to this point here, as on the theory of Probability adopted in this work it does not appear to be at all material to the science. But it seems a strong argument against the expediency of commencing the study of the science from the subjective side, or even of assigning any great degree of prominence to this side.