The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
19. But when we attempt to apply the same test to
_partial_ belief, we shall find ourselves reduced to an awkward
perplexity. A difficulty now emerges which has been singularly
overlooked by those who have treated of the subject.
As a simple example will serve our purpose, we will take the
case of a penny. I am about to toss one up, and I therefore
half believe, to adopt the current language, that it will give
head. Now it seems to be overlooked that if we appeal to
the event, as we did in the case last examined, our belief
must inevitably be wrong, and therefore the test above mentioned
will fail. For the thing must either happen or not
happen: i.e. in this case the penny must either give head, or
not give it; there is no third alternative. But whichever
way it occurs, our half-belief, so far as such a state of mind
admits of interpretation, must be wrong. If head does come,
I am wrong in not having expected it enough; for I only half
believed in its occurrence. If it does not happen, I am
equally wrong in having expected it too much; for I half
believed in its occurrence, when in fact it did not occur at all.
The same difficulty will occur in every case in which we
attempt to justify our state of partial belief in a single contingent
event. Let us take another example, slightly differing
from the last. A man is to receive £1 if a die gives six,
to pay 1_s_. if it gives any other number. It will generally be
admitted that he ought to give 2_s_. 6_d_. for the chance, and
that if he does so he will be paying a fair sum. This example
only differs from the last in the fact that instead of
simple belief in a proposition, we have taken what mathematicians
call 'the _value_ of the expectation'. In other words,
we have brought into a greater prominence, not merely the belief,
but the conduct which is founded upon the belief. But
precisely the same difficulty recurs here. For appealing to the
event,--the single event, that is,--we see that one or other
party must lose his money without compensation. In what
sense then can such an expectation be said to be a fair one?
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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