The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
(1) We can make inferences by simple addition. If,
for instance, there are two distinct properties observable in
various members of the series, which properties do not occur
in the same individual; it is plain that in any batch the
number that are of one kind or the other will be equal to the
sum of those of the two kinds separately. Thus 36.4 infants
in 100 live to over sixty, 35.4 in 100 die before they are
ten;[2] take a large number, say 10,000, then there will be
about 3640 who live to over sixty, and about 3540 who do
not reach ten; hence the total number who do not die within
the assigned limits will be about 2820 altogether. Of course
if these proportions were accurately assigned, the resultant
sum would be equally accurate: but, as the reader knows, in
Probability this proportion is merely the limit towards which
the numbers tend in the long run, not the precise result
assigned in any particular case. Hence we can only venture
to say that this is the limit towards which we tend as the
numbers become greater and greater.
This rule, in its general algebraic form, would be expressed
in the language of Probability as follows:--If the
chances of two exclusive or incompatible events be respectively
1/m and 1/n the chance of one or other of them
happening will be 1/m + 1/n or (m + n)/mn. Similarly if there were
more than two events of the kind in question. On the principles
adopted in this work, the rule, when thus algebraically
expressed, means precisely the same thing as when it is
expressed in the statistical form. It was shown at the conclusion
of the last chapter that to say, for example, that the
chance of a given event happening in a certain way is 1/6, is
only another way of saying that in the long run it does tend
to happen in that way once in six times.
It is plain that a sort of corollary to this rule might be
obtained, in precisely the same way, by subtraction instead of
addition. Stated generally it would be as follows:--If the
chance of one or other of two incompatible events be 1/m and
the chance of one alone be 1/n, the chance of the remaining
one will be 1/m - 1/n or (n - m)/nm.
For example, if the chance of any one dying in a year is 1/10,
and his chance of dying of some particular disease is 1/100,
his chance of dying of any other disease is 9/100.
The reader will remark here that there are two apparently
different modes of stating this rule, according as we speak
of 'one or other of two or more events happening,' or of 'the
same event happening in one or other of two or more ways.'
But no confusion need arise on this ground; either way of
speaking is legitimate, the difference being merely verbal,
and depending (as was shown in the first chapter, §8) upon
whether the distinctions between the 'ways' are or are not
too deep and numerous to entitle the event to be conventionally
regarded as the same.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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