The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
2. When m = 1 the fraction becomes 2/3; i.e. the odds are 2 to 1 in
favour of recurrence. And there are writers who accept this
result. For instance, Jevons (_Principles of Science_ p. 258) says
"Thus on the first occasion on which a person sees a shark, and
notices that it is accompanied by a little pilot fish, the odds are
2 to 1 that the next shark will be so accompanied." To say nothing
of the fact that recognizing and naming the fish implies that they
have often been seen before, how many of the observed
characteristics of that single 'event' are to be considered
essential? Must the pilot precede; and at the same distance? Must
we consider the latitude, the ocean, the season, the species of
shark, as matter also of repetition on the next occasion? and so
on. I cannot see how the Inductive problem can be even intelligibly
stated, for quantitative purposes, on the first occurrence of any
event.
3. See in _Mind_ (x. 454) Mr Jacob's account of the researches of Herr
Ebbinghaus as described in his work _Ueber das Gedächtniss_.
CHAPTER IX.
_INDUCTION AND ITS CONNECTION WITH PROBABILITY._
1. We were occupied, during the last chapter, with the
examination of a rule, the object of which was to enable
us to make inferences about instances as yet unexamined.
It was professedly, therefore, a rule of an inductive character.
But, in the form in which it is commonly expressed,
it was found to fail utterly. It is reasonable therefore to
enquire at this point whether Probability is entirely a formal
or deductive science, or whether, on the other hand, we are
able, by means of it, to make valid inferences about instances
as yet unexamined. This question has been already in part
answered by implication in the course of the last two chapters.
It is proposed in the present chapter to devote a fuller
investigation to this subject, and to describe, as minutely as
limits will allow, the nature of the connection between Probability
and Induction. We shall find it advisable for clearness
of conception to commence our enquiry at a somewhat
early stage. We will travel over the ground, however, as
rapidly as possible, until we approach the boundary of what
can properly be termed Probability.
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