The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
18. But then at once there begins to arise some doubt
and ambiguity as to what exactly is to be understood by his
circumstances. We may know very well what these circumstances
are in themselves, and yet be in perplexity as to
how many of them we ought to take into account when
endeavouring to estimate his fate. We might conceivably,
for a beginning, choose to confine our attention to those
properties only which he has in common with all animals.
If so, and statistics on the subject were attainable, they
would presumably be of some such character as this, Ninety-nine
animals out of a hundred die within a year. Unusual as
such a reference would be, we should, logically speaking, be
doing nothing more than taking a wider class than the one
we were accustomed to. Similarly we might, if we pleased,
take our stand at the class of vertebrates, or at that of
mammalia, if zoologists were able to give us the requisite
information. Of course we reject these wide classes and
prefer a narrower one. If asked why we reject them, the
natural answer is that they are so general, and resemble the
particular case before us in so few points, that we should be
exceedingly likely to go astray in trusting to them. Though
accuracy cannot be insured, we may at least avoid any needless
exaggeration of the relative number and magnitude of
our errors.
19. The above answer is quite valid; but whilst cautioning
us against appealing to too wide a class, it seems to
suggest that we cannot go wrong in the opposite direction,
that is in taking too narrow a class. And yet we do avoid
any such extremes. John Smith is not only an Englishman;
he may also be a native of such a part of England, be living
in such a Presidency, and so on. An indefinite number of
such additional characteristics might be brought out into
notice, many of which at any rate have some bearing upon
the question of vitality. Why do we reject any consideration
of these narrower classes? We do reject them, but it is for
what may be termed a practical rather than a theoretical
reason. As was explained in the first chapters, it is essential
that our series should contain a considerable number of terms
if they are to be of any service to us. Now many of the
attributes of any individual are so rare that to take them
into account would be at variance with the fundamental
assumption of our science, viz. that we are properly concerned
only with the averages of large numbers. The more special
and minute our statistics the better, provided only that we
can get enough of them, and so make up the requisite large
number of instances. This is, however, impossible in many
cases. We are therefore obliged to neglect one attribute
after another, and so to enlarge the contents of our class; at
the avowed risk of somewhat increased variety and unsuitability
in the members of it, for at each step of this kind we
diverge more and more from the sort of instances that we
really want. We continue to do so, until we no longer gain
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account