The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
23. Practically, of course, if we were forced to a decision
with only these data before us, we should make our
choice by the consideration that the state of a man's lungs
has probably more to do with his health than the place of
his birth has; that is, we should conclude that the duration
of life of consumptive Englishmen corresponds much more
closely with that of consumptive persons in general than
with that of their healthy countrymen. But this is, of
course, to import empirical considerations into the question.
The data, as they are given to us, and if we confine ourselves
to them, leave us in absolute uncertainty upon the
point. It may be that the consumptive Englishmen almost
all die when transported into the other climate; it may be
that they almost all recover. If they die, this is in obvious
accordance with the first set of statistics; it will be found in
accordance with the second set through the fact of the
foreign consumptives profiting by the change of climate in
more than what might be termed their due proportion.
A similar explanation will apply to the other alternative,
viz. to the supposition that the consumptive Englishmen
mostly recover. The problem is, therefore, left absolutely
indeterminate, for we cannot here appeal to any general rule
so simple and so obviously applicable as that which, in a
former case, recommended us always to prefer the more
special statistics, when sufficiently extensive, to those which
are wider and more general. We have no means here of
knowing whether one set is more special than the other.
And in this no difficulty can be found, so long as we
confine ourselves to a just view of the subject. Let me
again recall to the reader's mind what our present position
is; we have substituted for knowledge of the individual
(finding that unattainable) a knowledge of what occurs in
the average of similar cases. This step had to be taken the
moment the problem was handed over to Probability. But
the conception of similarity in the cases introduces us to a
perplexity; we manage indeed to evade it in many instances,
but here it is inevitably forced upon our notice.
There are here two aspects of this similarity, and they
introduce us to two distinct averages. Two assertions are
made as to what happens in the long run, and both of these
assertions, by supposition, are verified. Of their truth there
need be no doubt, for both were supposed to be obtained
from experience.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account