The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
3. From the earliest study of the syllogistic process
it was seen that, complete as that process is within its own
domain, the domain, at any rate under its simplest treatment,
is a very limited one. Propositions of the pure form,--All
(or some) A is (or is not) B,--are found in practice to form
but a small portion even of our categorical statements. We
are perpetually meeting with others which express the relation
of B to A with various degrees of necessity or probability;
e.g. A must be B, A may be B; or the effect of
such facts upon our judgment, e.g. I am perfectly certain
that A is B, I think that A may be B; with many others of
a more or less similar type. The question at once arises,
How are such propositions to be treated? It does not seem
to have occurred to the old logicians, as to some of their successors
in modern times, simply to reject all consideration of
this topic. Their faith in the truth and completeness of
their system of inference was far too firm for them to suppose
it possible that forms of proposition universally recognized
as significant in popular speech, and forms of inference
universally recognized there as valid, were to be omitted
because they were inconvenient or complicated.
4. One very simple plan suggests itself, and has indeed
been repeatedly advocated, viz. just to transfer all that
is characteristic of such propositions into that convenient receptacle
for what is troublesome elsewhere, the predicate.[2]
Has not another so-called modality been thus got rid of?[3]
and has it not been attempted by the same device to abolish
the distinctive characteristic of negative propositions, viz. by
shifting the negative particle into the predicate? It must
be admitted that, up to a certain point, something may be
done in this way. Given the reasoning, 'Those who take
arsenic will probably die; A has taken it, therefore he will
probably die;' it is easy to convert this into an ordinary
syllogism of the pure type, by simply wording the major,
'Those who take arsenic are people-who-will-probably-die,'
when the conclusion follows in the same form, 'A is one
who-will-probably-die.' But this device will only carry us
a very little way. Suppose that the minor premise also is
of the same modal description, e.g. 'A has probably taken
arsenic,' and it will be seen that we cannot relegate the
modality here also to the predicate without being brought to
a stop by finding that there are four terms in the syllogism.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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