The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
8. In any employment of applied logic we have of
course to go through such a process as that just mentioned.
Outside of pure mathematics it can hardly ever be the case
that the premises from which we reason are held with absolute
conviction. Hence there must be a lapse from absolute
conviction in the conclusion. But we reason on the hypothesis
that the premises are true, and any trifling defection
from certainty, of which we may be conscious, is mentally
reserved as a qualification to the conclusion. But such considerations
as these belong rather to ordinary applied logic;
they amount to nothing more than a caution or hint to be
borne in mind when the rules of the syllogism, or of induction,
are applied in practice. When, however, we are
treating of modality, the extent of the defection from full
certainty is supposed to be sufficiently great for our language
to indicate and appreciate it. What we then want is of
course a scientific discussion of the principles in accordance
with which this departure is to be measured and expressed,
both in our premises and in our conclusion. Such a plan
therefore for treating modality, as the one under discussion,
is just as much a banishment of it from the field of real
logical enquiry, as if we had determined avowedly to reject it
from consideration.
9. Before proceeding to a discussion of the various
ways in which modality may be treated by those who admit
it into logic, something must be said to clear up a possible
source of confusion in this part of the subject. In the
cases with which we have hitherto been mostly concerned,
in the earlier chapters of this work, the characteristic of
modality (for in this chapter we may with propriety use this
logical term) has generally been found in singular and particular
propositions. It presented itself when we had to
judge of individual cases from a knowledge of the average,
and was an expression of the fact that the proposition relating
to these individuals referred to a portion only of the
whole class from which the average was taken. Given that
of men of fifty-five, three out of five will die in the course of
twenty years, we have had to do with propositions of the
vague form, 'It is probable that AB (of that age) will die,'
or of the more precise form, 'It is three to two that AB will
die,' within the specified time. Here the modal proposition
naturally presents itself in the form of a singular or particular
proposition.
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