10. But when we turn to ordinary logic we may find _universal_ propositions spoken of as modal. This must mostly be the case with those which are termed necessary or impossible, but it may also be the case with the probable. We may meet with the form 'All X is probably Y.' Adopting the same explanation here as has been throughout adopted in analogous cases, we must say that what is meant by the modality of such a proposition is the proportional number of times in which the universal proposition would be correctly made. And in this there is, so far, no difficulty. The only difference is that whereas the justification of the former, viz. the particular or individual kind of modal, was obtainable within the limits of the universal proposition which included it, the justification of the modality of a universal proposition has to be sought in a group or succession of other propositions. The proposition has to be referred to some group of similar ones and we have to consider the proportion of cases in which it will be true. But this distinction is not at all fundamental. It is quite true that universal propositions from their nature are much less likely than individual ones to be justified, in practice, by such appeal. But, as has been already frequently pointed out, we are not concerned with the way in which our propositions are practically obtained, nor with the way in which men might find it most natural to test them; but with that ultimate justification to which we appeal in the last resort, and which has been abundantly shown to be of a statistical character. When, therefore, we say that 'it is probable that all X is Y,' what we mean is, that in more than half the cases we come across we should be right in so judging, and in less than half the cases we should be wrong. 11. It is at this step that the possible ambiguity is encountered. When we talk of the chance that All X is Y, we contemplate or imply the complementary chance that it is not so. Now this latter alternative is not free from ambiguity. It might happen, for instance, in the cases of failure, that no X is Y, or it might happen that some X, only, is not Y; for both of these suppositions contradict the original proposition, and are therefore instances of its failure. In practice, no doubt, we should have various recognized rules and inductions to fall back upon in order to decide between these alternatives, though, of course, the appeal to them would be in strictness extralogical. But the mere existence of such an ambiguity, and the fact that it can only be cleared up by appeal to the subject-matter, are in themselves no real difficulty in the application of the conception of modality to universal propositions as well as to individual ones.