The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
20. Our examples throughout this chapter have been
almost exclusively drawn from physical characteristics,
whether of man or of inanimate things; but it need not be
supposed that we are necessarily confined to such instances.
Mr Galton, for instance, has proposed to extend the same
principles of calculation to mental phenomena, with a view
to their more accurate determination. The objects to be
gained by so doing belong rather to the inferential part of
our subject, and will be better indicated further on; but
they do not involve any distinct principle. Like other attempts
to apply the methods of science in the region of the
mind, this proposal has met with some opposition; with very
slight reason, as it seems to me. That our mental qualities,
if they could be submitted to accurate measurement, would
be found to follow the usual Law of Error, may be assumed
without much hesitation. The known extent of the correlation
of mental and bodily characteristics gives high probability
to the supposition that what is proved to prevail, at
any rate approximately, amongst most bodily elements which
have been submitted to measurement, will prevail also
amongst the mental elements.
To what extent such measurements could be carried
out practically, is another matter. It does not seem to
me that it could be done with much success; partly because
our mental qualities are so closely connected with,
indeed so run into one another, that it is impossible to
isolate them for purposes of comparison.[16] This is to some
extent indeed a difficulty in bodily measurements, but it is
far more so in those of the mind, where we can hardly get
beyond what can be called a good guess. The doctrine,
therefore, that mental qualities follow the now familiar law
of arrangement can scarcely be grounded upon anything
more than a strong analogy. Still this analogy is quite
strong enough to justify us in accepting the doctrine and
all the conclusions which follow from it, in so far as our
estimates and measurements can be regarded as trustworthy.
There seems therefore nothing unreasonable in the attempt
to establish a system of natural classification of mankind
by arranging them into a certain number of groups above
and below the average, each group being intended to correspond
to certain limits of excellency or deficiency.[17] All
that is necessary for such a purpose is that the rate of
departure from the mean should be tolerably constant under
widely different circumstances: in this case throughout all
the races of man. Of course if the law of divergence is
the same as that which prevails in inanimate nature we
have a still wider and more natural system of classification
at hand, and one which ought to be familiar, more or less, to
every one who has thus to estimate qualities.
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