The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
17. How utterly inappropriate any such conception is
in most of the cases in which we find statistical uniformity,
will be obvious on a moment's consideration. The observed
phenomena are generally the product, in these cases, of very
numerous and complicated antecedents. The number of
crimes, for instance, annually committed in any society, is a
function amongst other things, of the strictness of the law,
the morality of the people, their social condition, and the
vigilance of the police, each of these elements being in itself
almost infinitely complex. Now, as a result of all these
agencies, there is some degree of uniformity; but what has
been called above the change of type, which it sooner or
later tends to display, is unmistakeable. The average annual
numbers do not show a steady gradual approach towards
what might be considered in some sense a limiting value,
but, on the contrary, fluctuate in a way which, however it
may depend upon causes, shows none of the permanent uniformity
which is characteristic of games of chance. This
fact, combined with the obvious arbitrariness of singling out,
from amongst the many and various antecedents which produced
the observed regularity, a few only, which should constitute
the objective probability (if we took all, the events
being absolutely determined, there would be no occasion for
an appeal to probability in the case), would have been sufficient
to prevent any one from assuming the existence of
any such thing, unless the mistaken analogy of other cases
had predisposed him to seek for it.
There is a familiar practical form of the same error, the
tendency to which may not improbably be derived from a
similar theoretical source. It is that of continuing to accumulate
our statistical data to an excessive extent. If the
type were absolutely fixed we could not possibly have too
many statistics; the longer we chose to take the trouble
of collecting them the more accurate our results would be.
But if the type is changing, in other words, if some of the
principal causes which aid in their production have, in regard
to their present degree of intensity, strict limits of time or
space, we shall do harm rather than good if we overstep
these limits. The danger of stopping too soon is easily seen,
but in avoiding it we must not fall into the opposite error of
going on too long, and so getting either gradually or suddenly
under the influence of a changed set of circumstances.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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